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In 2011 we proposed that the modern advances in neurosciences would eventually push the
field of psychology to an hour of truth as concerns its identity: indeed, what is psychology, if
psychological functions and instances can be tied to characterized brain patterns (Bazan, 2011)? As
Axel Cleeremans opens this Grand Challenge with a comparable question1, and as there is growing
disagreement with the “I am my brain” paradigm, we think that the topic is indeed, 5 years later,
crucially at stake. We had, in 2011, contextualized this question, as one driven by the advances
in biology—anatomy in the sixteenth century, (neuro-)physiology in the nineteenth century and
neurosciences today. Indeed, with each major advance, decisive moments came for psychology: in
the sixteenth century, the name psychologia was launched, in the nineteenth century, psychology
became a full-blown scientific field, and today, its specific identity is being questioned (Bazan,
2015). It now appears indeed that it is neuroscientists themselves, who formulate the possibility
of a science of representational life, which is autonomous as regards to its biological substrates. For
example, the neuroscientist Etienne Koechlin in a conference in Paris on February 2nd, 2016, gave
as an alternative definition for neuroscience “the mechanisms and computational operations which
govern the mental representations independently from their material substrate and its content2”.We
will further propose that this autonomy is to be regarded as an organizational autonomy.
However, as psychology does not for now claim a clear identity of its own, it seeks refuge in the
medical model when it comes to being practiced, i.e., as concerns clinical psychology, mainly. This
has largely underestimated societal consequences. Indeed, the medical model is not adapted to the
specificities of mental health (Bazan, 2013). Crucially, for example, the first intervention tool in
mental health is the therapeutic alliance between patient and therapist (for review, see Wampold,
2001), and this is more important than the specific technique3, while in medicine the specific
technical interventions are decisive for the treatment. We have proposed elsewhere (Bazan, 2013,
2015) how this medical model has a substantial counterproductive effect, creating, and sustaining
1“It can rightfully be said that psychology lacks a clear identity”, http://journal.frontiersin.org/researchtopic/5440/grand-
challenges-for-psychological-science-in-the-21st-century.
2Our translation of ≪ les mécanismes et les traitements computationnels qui régissent les représentations mentales
indépendamment de leur substrat matériel et de leur contenu≫. We propose that this alternative definition of neurosciences
is, in fact, a definition of psychology.
3But see for a contradictory debate on this point, Keijsers (2014).
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mental health epidemics (mainly, by way of mediatized
reification). The question of the specific identity of psychology
thus has also societal and political implications—i.e., it is truly a
grand challenge for our field.
In these 5 years of the section “Psychoanalysis and
Neuropsychoanalysis” we have published a wide diversity of
papers, which by their often outstanding quality can contribute
to the dialogue of sciences. But, we’d venture to say, publishing
in the field of psychoanalysis, turns out to be a real challenge.
Indeed, if psychology might feel undecided as concerns its
identity, this seems exponentially all the more true for
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, including in academia and in the
dialogue with neuroscience, has the tendency to mellow some of
its most controversial aspects. In our opinion, in as much as it
indeed does so, it looses its interest for others and is cordially
and gladly assimilated, not to say, neutralized. For example,
in our opinion, psychoanalysis letting go of the drive concept,
is a real loss for adjacent disciplines. Intuitively, we are all
inclined to think that affect governs our behavior, for everything
converges to show that we approach what is pleasurable, and
avoid, fly away, from what is unpleasant. Thorndike (1898) made
a law of that principle, Pavlov (1927) applied it, etc., and since
then, we teach it to generations of students all over the world.
Indeed, that someone would cling to something unpleasant,
might be threatening to our idea of the human condition: but,
the fact of the matter is, that the clinical practice shows just
that; it is even one main reason for consultation. “Doctor, I
know that it is bad for me, I am damaging myself, I’m about
to loose my spouse and my job, but I just can’t quit.” It is
at the heart of addiction, of phobia, of obsession; it is at the
heart of what we universally suffer from, namely, repetition
compulsion.
The proposition of an organizational autonomy of the mental
entails that there are no direct causal bridges between substrate
and subjective experience, even if the biological substrate enables
and constrains the mental dynamics governing the subjective
experience. In other words, we would like to point a difference
between the constraining role of the biological substrate—
which is simultaneously its enabling role—for the advent of a
mental organization, and its role in determining the meaning
of mental experience, for which we posit mental constructs are
more proximal, and therefore better, explanations. Repetition
compulsion, now, is a good illustration of this difference between
determination and constraint. A vertebrate body plan basically
involves two bodies: an internal, invertebrate smooth muscle
body constituted by the so-called vegetative bodily functions,
where our needs originate (ex. air, food, liquid, defecation) and
an external, vertebrate striated muscle body constituted by the
skeleton and the skeletal muscles to move it. When a need
arises in the internal body, it is the external body, which should
realize in the world a so-called adequate act (Freud, 1905/1953:p.
184) to satisfy that need. As Freud (1905/1953:p. 184) says:
“we may expect that Nature will have made safe provisions so
that this experience of satisfaction shall not be left to chance.”
Whenever a proper movement by surprise brings satisfaction,
this is biologically marked by a dopamine peak at the level of
the nucleus accumbens (Schultz, 1998), which will from that
point on, enhance the probability of that action to be reactivated
whenever stimuli are reminiscent of the inaugural event (see also,
Bazan and Detandt, 2013). This dopamine incentive sensitization
(Robinson and Berridge, 1993, 2000, 2003; Berridge, 2007) can
be seen as a compensation mechanism for the fact that the
external body arose at once with the emergence of vertebrates
and took over the motor interaction of the organism with the
external world. With organisms suddenly having two bodies
with each their proper logic, there was need for a biological
historicization system adjusting inner body needs to outer body
actions. This is even more so the case in humans due to their
premature condition when thrown into the world: humans much
more than other animals are at loss on what adequate reaction
could effectively discharge accumulating inner body tension, and,
except for breathing, will depend on interactions with others for
the organization of these actions. This means, that humans will
biologically historicize their interactions with others. This is the
basis for the repetition compulsion. For example, say that the
first other is quite unreliable. Then, in order to maximize the
chances for survival the child historicizes seduction techniques
addressed to an unreliable other, and will have more probability
in adult life to search for unreliable partners in order to re-
deploy these seduction techniques. The bodily constraints—
here, the need for a biological historicization mechanism for
motor patterns deployed at inaugural moments—bring about a
repetition compulsion in the interaction with others, which is
constitutive for human mental life. Biology summons humans to
the history of their (early) interactions, but does not dictate the
mental experience of this repetition. In the experiential realm,
properly mental logics for the organization of meaning take
over, such as the tension between primary process associative
tendencies (e.g., “this seemingly unreliable woman reminds me
of mymother”) and secondary process reflexive reinterpretations
(e.g., “however, as a grown-up now, I’ll be smarter and
deploy better strategies, or, alternatively, quit this endeavor
altogether”). The clinical logic underlying the experience of
the subject will be more readily grasped by these proximal
mental dynamics, than what is feasible to infer from neuronal
computations.
However, what might be an epistemological difference
between psyche and soma? Let’s again take the example of
repetition compulsion. From a mental perspective, we have
proposed that Lacan’s theory4 deploys a logical order in which
to situate the repetition compulsion (Bazan and Detandt, 2013).
This temporal logic would involve (1) the emerging drive, (2) an
experience of satisfaction, (3) accumulating bodily tension (upon
reminiscing stimuli) and finally, (4) a repetition compulsion.
Moreover, we have proposed that these four logical times
found an equivalence in different aspects of the mesolimbic
dopaminergic system, namely (1) Panksepp’s seeking system
(Panksepp, 1998); (2) Schultz’s reward dopamine spike (Schultz,
1998); (3) Olds and Milner’s “pleasure” center (Olds and Milner,
1954); and (4) Berridge and Robinson’s incentive sensitization
(Ibid.). Now, in a physiological framework these respective events
do not seem to have a particular reciprocal order. Indeed,
4This is his theory on jouissance (Lacan, 1986/1959–1960).
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we propose that physiological processes are inherently cyclical:
giving them a begin- or endpoint in time is always a matter
of arbitrarily cutting a cycle. Order effects, at a biological level,
seem unimportant—which is keenly illustrated by this famous
question: what was first, the chicken or the egg? This is all the
more true for neuronal processes, which, for the majority of
them, proceed through cycling waves of neuron populations, and
which, most of the time, are reciprocally connected. Therefore,
our proposition is that the body has an extension in space,
in such a way that it can be said of bodily elements that
they are “left and right” (Snellius, 1594: p. 275), but that the
body is however not constitutively organized by time order
effects. We propose that, in contrast, the mental apparatus has
no constitutive extension in space but has an extension in
time, in such a way that it can be specifically said of mental
elements that they are “anterior or posterior to one another.”
In other words, order effects are of constitutive importance for
the mental, and therefore, in contrast with the cyclical nature
of the physiological, are proposed to be inherently historical.
In short, the mental reality is a dynamical reality, not a tissue
reality.
This neuropsychoanalytic exercise concerning repetition
compulsion has thus resulted in the proposition of a
major epistemological difference between body and mind.
Therefore, the relentless re-elaborating—through theory, clinical
practice, and research—of the fundamental building blocks of
metapsychology—such as e.g., primary and secondary processes,
repression, repetition compulsion—in the current scientific
context should be at the core of our concerns. The grand
5“The physical things closer to natural bodies that move naturally, have an
extension and for that reason occupy a space. (...) That is why geometrical
properties are suited to natural bodies and, as different parts are in different places,
they are in front, behind, above, below, left and right.” (Snellius, 1594, p. 26–27;
our translation of the original Latin text).
challenge, then, for psychoanalysis at this very moment in the
history of sciences, in our opinion, is to go for its theory, and
to stand by its counterintuitive, unpopular aspects, whatever the
newest fashion reigning in the sciences of the mind, as long as
these are both logically and clinically sound. We are privileged
to hear subjects in their utmost intimacy, in things they often
even don’t share with their most loved ones. It is therefore our
duty, if we are recipients of this kind of far reaching trust, to
live up to this confidence, by giving the intimacy of what it
means to be human, a voice in the larger scientific, and societal,
debate.
To close this “grand challenge” we launch a call for new
contributions in the large domain of psychoanalysis: we
value original research, but also theoretical contributions,
reviews or critical debates and research topics which
pertain to psychoanalysis or neuropsychoanalysis, including
epistemological perspectives upon the field. Let’s take
this opportunity with both hands to have this section of
Frontiers function as a real, internationally valued tool for our
field.
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